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Rethinking Militarism in Post-Apartheid South Africa1 
Jacklyn Cock 




This paper argues that contemporary South Africa is marked by a co-existence of both old and 
new forms of militarism. It tries to move beyond the statist conception of militarism in much 
of the scholarly literature in order to examine social relations more broadly, and the 
appropriation of the means and instruments of violence by non-state groups, what Appadurai 
has termed the “privatization of the state”. 2 ‘Militarism’ is thus used here very broadly to refer 
both to the military as a formal state institution and to various non-state forms, expressions 
and instruments of organised violence.  
 
The paper argues that a shallow and uneven process of state demilitarisation was underway in 
South Africa from 1990 in the form of reductions in military expenditure, weapons holdings, 
force levels, demobilisation, employment in arms production and base closures. However, this 
has had contradictory consequences. The failure to provide for the effective social integration 
of ex-combatants throughout the Southern African region, as well as ineffective disarmament 
in post-conflict peace building, has provided an impetus to a ‘privatised militarism’. This is 
evident in three related processes: new forms of violence, the commoditisation of security, 
through the growth of private security firms and, most importantly, the proliferation of small 
arms. 
 
It is argued that small arms are highly racialised and linked to a militarised conception of 
citizenship. This feeds into a militarist nationalism, which claims a powerful army as an 
indicator of state power, which helps to explain a process of re-militarisation – evident in the 
R60 billion re-armament programme and increasing reliance on the military as an instrument 
of foreign policy since 1998. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for a regional 
approach to security as a further corrective to a narrow, statist focus on the South African 
National Defence Force. 
 
The focus on different forms and levels of militarism in contemporary South Africa is 
complicated by contestations about meaning. Several analyses have stressed that ‘militarism’ 
is a contested concept;3 but as Merryfinch observes, “like electricity, ‘militarism’ can best be 
                                                 
1 The main sources of data for this paper are textual analysis of government documents and newspaper 
commentary as well as 30 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key informants involved in defence and 
security issues in the Southern African region. This research methodology was adopted given the tendency of 
questionnaires to fracture experience and fail to provide explanatory insights. The interviews were conducted by 
myself and my status as a white, middle class South African woman, has obviously coloured my interpretation 
and the responses I received. The paper also draws on insights derived from my participant observation in the 
demilitarisation movement in South Africa. 
2 Arjun Appadurai, ‘Deep democracy: Urban governmentality and the horizon of politics’, Public Culture, 14:1 
(2002), p24. 
3 Charles Tilly, ‘War and the International System 1900 – 1992’, New York: New School for Social Research, 
1992; Volker Berghan, Militarism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981;  Martin Shaw, Post-Military 
Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1991. 
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described by its effects. When military goals, values and apparatus increasingly dominate a 
state’s culture, politics and economy, militarism is on the rise”. 4 Shaw writes that “Militarism 
and militarization do not depend simply or directly on the role of the military in society”.5 
Instead he argues for moving beyond a narrow focus on military institutions to address 
military culture. Similarly Mann broadens the concept of militarism beyond a narrow focus on 
military institutions to refer to “a set of attitudes and social practices which regard war and the 
preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity”. 6 In the same vein E.P. 
Thompson warns against a narrow focus on concepts such as “the military industrial 
complex”. In his view, this “suggests that the evil is confined in a known and limited place: it 
may threaten to push forward, but it can be restrained, contamination does not extend through 
the whole societal body”. In terms of his analysis, “the USA and the USSR do not have 
military-industrial complexes: they are such complexes”. 7 Similarly, this paper argues that 
contemporary South Africa is contaminated by diverse forms of militarism, which have 
percolated through the entire society. 
 
The Restructuring of the Military and the Process of Demilitarisation 
During the 1976 - 1990 period the apartheid army, the South African Defence Force (SADF), 
was positioned at the centre of a highly militarised country.8 It was marked by the 
mobilisation of resources for war on political, economic and ideological levels. Defence 
expenditures soared and the power of the SADF expanded to the point where it was 
positioned at the centre of state decision-making and penetrated deeply into many aspects of 
social life.9 Throughout the 1980s the SADF suppressed resistance in arenas as diverse as 
education, health and labour. The Defence Force was deployed to evict rent defaulters, 
occupy black schools, guard polling booths, invade health clinics to identify the injured, 
maintain beach apartheid, monitor demonstrations, conduct forced removals, break strikes and 
‘re-educate’ political detainees. In these ways the SADF played a central role in creating a 
‘terrorist state’, which relied on the spread of extreme fear to ma intain its authority. 10 
 
The transition from this ‘terrorist state’ to democracy, between 1990 and 1994, was the result 
not of a ‘miracle’ or the seizure of power, but of a negotiated settlement that involved many 
explicit and implicit compromises. These compromises left key elements of apartheid 
privilege and power intact. Some of these are located in the new post-apartheid army, which 
is the product of a process of restructuring rather than transformation, reflecting the 
incorporation of the liberation movement into existing institutions that serve elite interests.11  
 
                                                 
4 Lesley Merryfinch, ‘Militarism’, in Chapkis, Wendy (ed.), Loaded Questions: Women in the Militaries, 
Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 1981, p.9. 
5 Shaw (1991), p.14. 
6 Michael Mann, ‘The roots and contradictions of modern militarism’, New Left Review, 167 (March 1987), p.4. 
7 Edward Thompson, ‘Notes on exterminism, the last stage of civilization’, in New Left Review (ed.), 
Exterminism and the Cold War, London: Verso, 1982, pp.21-22. 
8 Jacklyn Cock & Laurie Nathan (eds), War and Society. The militarisation of South Africa, Cape Town: David 
Phillip, 1989; Kenneth Grundy, The Militarisation of South African Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989. 
9 Cock & Nathan (1989); Phillip Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians. Civil military relations in South Africa, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine, London: 
International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986. 
10 Jacklyn Cock, ‘The role of violent in current state security strategies’, in M. Swilling (ed.), Views on the South 
African State, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1990, pp.85-105. 
11 Hein Marais, South Africa. Limits to Change. The political economy of transformation, London: Zed Book, 
1998. 
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During the 1990-1994 period of transition, an alliance of militarists from the various armed 
formations emerged. This alliance took shape in the form of the post-apartheid army, the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which involved an amalgamation of seven 
different armed formations, each responsible to a different political authority. The integration 
of these former adversaries is a powerful symbol and practical demonstration of the  
commitment to reconciliation. However, the restructuring of the military does not mean that 
the institution has moved to the margins of South African society. On the contrary, the 
SANDF continues to loom large and to cannibalise scarce resources and wield considerable 
political, economic and ideological power. Nevertheless, the post-apartheid re-organisation of 
the military was part of a process of state demilitarisation that was seemingly rudderless. 
Much of the movement of power and resources away from the military can best be described 
as what Luckham has called “demilitarisation by default”, that is “military reductions forced 
by economic decline and the withdrawal of foreign military support after the end of the Cold 
War”. 12 Similarly, Williams has maintained that in South Africa the “various initiatives [of 
demilitarisation] are uneven, asymmetrical and, in some cases, incomplete”. 13  
 
It has been claimed that the new structure, the SANDF is a “unified force, demographically 
representative of South Africa, uniformly trained, combat-ready with a uniformity of 
purpose”. 14 Boshoff along with other scholars has emphasised that the SANDF is a very 
different organisation from the SADF.15 With a total of 59,000 members, the SANDF is much 
smaller; and in relation to its manpower procurement policy, conscription for white men has 
been replaced by voluntary recruitment of all South Africans. Social composition at rank-and-
file level is becoming more representative of the population in ethnic, racial and gender terms, 
and less a reflection of the white minority, while the command structure of the SANDF has 
been deracialised. In 1994, less than one per cent of officers were black but by 1999 this had 
risen to 31 per cent. However, it has recently been alleged that the SANDF is top heavy, with 
208 generals and admirals, a ratio of one general for every 293 men compared with a general 
for every 2,000 men in the US army. 16 It has also been admitted that, “representivity in the 
force is still skewed ...with middle management still mostly white colonels”. 17 
 
The SANDF is also still not representative in gender terms, as women only constitute 13 per 
cent of the force and many reported problems with sexual harassment and gender stereotyping 
that degrade women persist. There is little evidence that the institutional culture of the 
defence force has changed significantly. According to several sources, along with sexism, 
racism is rife and there have been several incidents of racialised violence reported. Black 
soldiers report being subjected to ‘political harassment’ and ridiculed, which they believe is 
intended to lower the morale of soldiers belonging to Mkhonto we Sizwe (MK) (Spear of the 
Nation), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Azanian People’s 
Liberation Army (APLA), armed wing of the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and ultimately 
                                                 
12 Robin Luckham, ‘The military, militarism and democratisation in Africa’, in E. Hutchful & A. Bathily (eds), 
The military and militarism in Africa, Dakar: Codesria, 1995, p.49. 
13 Rocky Williams, ‘Reallocating Defence Expenditures for Development: The South African Experience’, 
African Security Review, 7:2 (1998), p.46. 
14 Henri Boshoff, ‘Defence needs are social needs’, The Star, 24 July 2002, p.9. 
15 Ian Liebenberg, ‘The Integration of the Military in Post-liberation South Africa’, Armed Forces and Society, 
24:1 (Fall 1997), pp.105-132; Gary Kynoch, ‘The transformation of the South African military’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 34:3 (September 1996) , pp.441-457; Gavin Cawthra & Bjorn Moller, Defensive 
Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa,  Dartmouth: Macmillan, 1997. 
16 The Sunday Independent , 14 July 2002. 
17 Defence force chief Sipiwe Nyanda, quoted in The Sowetan , 24 March 2003. 
 4
force them out of the SANDF. Dissatisfaction is particularly intense over the ranking 
procedures.18 
 
The formation of the SANDF was also associated with an emphasis on professionalism. 
However, while the chair of the parliamentary Defence Committee, Tandi Modise, declared 
that “There is no need for hysteria”, 19 other informants have spoken of a ‘crisis’ in relation to 
operational capability. Most informants agree that currently the SANDF is not a strong, or 
cohesive force. Low morale is amplified by high numbers of soldiers being medically unfit. 
There is a heavy incidence of HIV/AIDS within the forces, variously reported at 23 per cent 
in the SANDF as a whole,20 or 60 per cent of all soldiers.21 According to the Surgeon-General 
of the SADF, 21 per cent of the South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) is HIV-
positive.22 
 
The SANDF has not been subject to a comprehensive and far-reaching process of 
demilitarisation. However, steps towards demilitarisation are evident in the reduction and 
destruction of weapon holdings, particularly anti-personnel landmines and small arms, by the 
SANDF. Base closures represent another significant demilitarisation measure, though to date 
closures have occurred on a case-by-case basis and have not been framed within a coherent 
national conversion or demilitarisation strategy. In the absence of this and, despite policy 
commitments, with weak civilian control and uncontained downsizing and demobilisation, a 
‘privatised militarisism’ is being generated.  
 
Towards privatised Militarism 
Among the most significant aspects of the demilitarisation process have been attempts since 
1994 to secure the subordination of the military to civilian control. These include the 
establishment of a Defence Secretariat and the re-examination of the mission, roles and tasks 
of the SANDF through the White Paper on Defence (1996) and a defence review process. 
However, despite the centrality of the principle of subordination to civilian control as the 
cornerstone of post-apartheid defence policy, civilian control through the Defence Secretariat 
is weak.  
 
While the SADF was informed by militarist and statist notions of security, the 1996 White 
Paper articulated a holistic understanding of security. It provided for the country's first ever 
National Defence Review to translate policy into a new force design, reviewing force levels, 
structures and equipment. The Minister of Defence claimed that,  ‘Public participation in the 
review has been extensive. It is recognised as the most open and consultative defence review 
in the world’.23 However, the consultation was in fact shallow, limited and involved only 77 
submissions from civil society organisations. Partly because of the secrecy in which defence 
and security issues were shrouded under apartheid, civil society lacked the capacity to 
challenge the military and there was no strong, mass-based movement concerned with 
militarisation.  
 
                                                 
18 Briefing from the SANDF to the Parliamentary Defence Portfolio Committee, 27 May 2003. 
19 Cited in The Mail and Guardian, 20 March 2003. 
20 Boshoff (2002), p.9. 
21 The Sunday Independent, 14 July 2002. 
22 Briefing by the Surgeon-General, Lt. General van Rensberg, to the Parliamentary Defence Portfolio 
Committee, 18 March 2003. 
23 Minister Modise, cited in Mail and Guardian, 8 November 1996. 
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The most significant aspect of the demilitarisation process has been a ‘downsizing’ or 
rationalisation, which involved reduction in force levels to 59,000 in 2003 compared to 
110,000 in 1994. Altogether some 30,000 soldiers have been formally demobilised from the 
SANDF in recent years, with very different packages. In addition it has been claimed that 
more than 20 per cent of liberation army soldiers integrated into the SANDF since 1994 have 
left because of ill-treatment: “There is no structure of grievances for our people, except 
through officers who are mostly racist. They are not being taken on courses to improve their 
skills and are overlooked for promotion”. 24 
 
The total number of ex-combatants in South Africa is contested. According to Department of 
Defence policy analyst, Dr Rocky Williams, there could be as many as 150,000.25 This 
number would include those whose names did not appear on the Certified Personnel Register 
(CPR), which was compiled by the Department of Defence during 1993 and 1994 and which 
formed the basis for integration. According to a SANDF briefing to the parliamentary 
Defence Portfolio Committee meeting on 27 May 2003, there are some 4,000 people who 
claim ex-combatant status and exclusion from the CPR. It would also include those who have 
left the SANDF for a variety of reasons since 1996, those who returned to South Africa after 
the suspension of armed struggle in August 1990 (an informal process of demobilisation) as 
well as those formally demobilised since 1994. The number of ex-combatants will grow with 
the planned further reduction of the size of the army to 33,900 soldiers.26  
 
Many ex-combatants are marked by their experience of war, their training in the means of 
violence, their lack of marketable skills and their access to weaponry. Throughout the 
Southern African region demobilisation has rarely involved either effective disarmament or 
effective social integration in the sense of restoring ex-combatants to their communities with 
access to employment and supportive social networks that would foster demilitarised social 
identities. Instead, many ex-combatants throughout the region have reported a sense of 
marginalisation and social dislocation. An increased incidence of banditry means that they 
have become the targets for much contemporary social anxiety about gun violence; and 
indeed, in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique demobilised soldiers have been a 
destabilising force. 
 
There has been no systematic monitoring of this category, but in at least three ways they are 
not contributing to peace building in the region: firstly, a number of the South African 
mercenaries that are involved in wars in the continent are ex-SADF soldiers; secondly, a 
number of demobilised soldiers are now employed in private security firms; and thirdly, 
numerous press reports have pointed out that many of the widespread armed robberies in 
South Africa are being done by highly ‘professional’ bandits with military backgrounds. For 
example according to one researcher, “the increase in crime is partially due to the fact that 
supposedly demobbed members of MK ... turned to crime after the struggle ended in 1994”.27  
 
Some of this crime represents a kind of commoditisation of violence. In recent interviews 
with two South African ex-combatants who had been convicted of criminal activity, both 
stressed that they had relied on crime to survive and had been forced into criminal activity for 
economic reasons. As one of them said, “a hungry stomach knows no law”. According to one 
                                                 
24 PAC Deputy Secretary-general, Wonder Masombuka, cited in The Sunday Times, 14 January 2001. 
25 Interview, Dr Rocky Williams, May 2003. 
26 Briefing by the SANDF to the Defence Joint Standing Committee, 4 March 2003. 
27 Anthony Minaar, quoted in The Sowetan, 29 September 1998. 
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key informant from Soweto, “Ex-combatants are often used as paid assassins. They will kill 
for a plate of porridge, R200 and a bottle of brandy”.   
  
There have been four studies on the social integration of ex-combatants in South Africa. The 
first survey of 180 respondents, during the informal demobilisation process that took place 
over the period of the transition, found that 72 per cent were unemployed and 67 per cent 
reported psychological problems.28 A sample of 307 ex-combatants (of which 66 per cent 
claimed to be from MK or APLA) found that 37 per cent were unemployed.29 A sense of 
marginalization emerged strongly from Gear’s study, which reports that many ex-combatants 
perceived themselves to have been “wished away”. 30 The most recent study involved 410 
questionnaires administered to a sample of ex-combatants, defined as members of APLA and 
MK, who received some form of military training under the political leadership of the PAC or 
ANC.31 This survey reported high levels of unemployment (66 per cent of the sample), 
disrupted education (close to 60 per cent did not have a matriculation certificate) and a strong 
sense of social exclusion. A large proportion (40 per cent) of respondents believed that ex-
combatants are discriminated against in the job market: “Whites control the economy of this 
country and they don’t like guerrillas. They say we are killers. Things will never be fine as 
long as they are in control”.32 This study reports a strong sense of entitlement alongside the 
grievance; 87 per cent of interviewed ex-combatants felt strongly that the government must 
establish special job creation programmes targeted specifically at them.33 Only nine per cent 
reported that the skills training they received from the Service Corps helped them find 
employment.34  
 
The Service Corps was instituted in 1995 to integrate demobilised “non-statutory force 
members into civilian society” by skills upgrading. It has absorbed millions but is weak. In 
2000 there were reports of an independent audit into an alleged misuse and possible 
misappropriation of some R300 million earmarked for the retraining of ex-combatants.35 It is 
estimated that between 1995 and 2002 the Service Corps trained only between 3,000 and 
4,000 former APLA and MK soldiers.36 In 1999, it was reported that the Service Corps 
employed 252 staff members while there were a total of 202 trainees.37  
 
The ex-combatants’ associations have largely failed to deliver on promises of establishing 
rehabilitation centres and business entities. Both the MK Military Veterans Association 
(MKMVA), established in 1996 and claiming some 45,000 members, and the Azanian 
People’s Liberation Army Veterans Association (APLAVA), established in 1997, suffer from 
serious organisational problems.38 Recently, the rift between the National Executive 
Committee of the MKMVA and its Gauteng provincial counterpart deepened when the 
                                                 
28 Jacklyn Cock, ‘Towards a common society: The integration of soldiers and armies in a future South Africa’, 
unpublished research report, 1993. 
29 Ian Liebenberg & M. M. I. Roefs, Demobilisation and its Aftermath II – Economic Reinsertion of South 
Africa’s demobilised military personnel , Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2001. 
30 Sasha Gear, ‘Wishing us Away: challenges facing ex-combatants in the new South Africa’, Violence and 
Transition series, Vol.8, 2002. 
31 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), ‘Soldiers of Misfortune’, Unpublished research report, 2003. 
32 CCR (2003), p.39. 
33 CCR (2003), p.78. 
34 CCR (2003), p.51. 
35 The Mail and Guardian, 8 September 2000. 
36 CCR (2003), p.49. 
37 CCR (2003), p.50. 
38 CCR (2003). 
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Committee ordered the closure of the Gauteng office and the suspension of two of its office 
bearers.39 
 
Overall, ex-combatants are increasingly expressing their collective sense of social exclusion 
in a variety of protest actions, including marches and threats to blockade roads and take 
hostages.40 In August 2002 a group of 70 ex-combatants from the Soldiers Forum, a new 
structure affiliated to the Anti-Privatisation Forum, formed part of a protest against the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. They were tear-gassed and arrested as 
they demonstrated at Johannesburg station. In June 2003, about 100 members of the Gauteng 
section of the MKMVA marched on the headquarters of the ANC to hand in a memorandum 
with a list of grievances.41  The disruptive potential of these ex-combatants is one of the 
contradictory consequences of the shallow, uneven process of state demilitarisation described 
above. In addition to the ineffective social integration of ex-combatants throughout the 
Southern African region, there has been ineffective disarmament in post-conflict peace 
building. The new armies are not strong, cohesive, well disciplined forces. In fact, a major 
source of the current proliferation of small arms is leakage from these formations.  
 
Arms flows were exacerbated by the UN's failure to effect meaningful disarmament after the 
termination of the 16 year civil war in Mozambique in 1992,42 a current influx of new 
weapons from Eastern Europe and many small arms now being dispersed throughout the 
population of Lesotho after the disturbance there in September 1998. More recently arms 
flows have been bolstered by the continued fighting in Angola until 2002, and recent reports 
suggest that Zambian villagers living along the Angola border are bartering goats and 
chickens in exchange for AK-47 rifles from Angolans.43  
 
Thus the proliferation of small arms is a material legacy of thirty years of war in the region. 
Antagonistic social identities and an ideology of militarism are an accompanying ideological 
legacy. Together they form a lethal mix. The proliferation of small arms enables individuals 
to express social antagonisms in violent ways. Such proliferation represents a form of 
privatised militarism, which exists alongside manifestations of older forms of state militarism 
evident in the SANDF re-armament programmes and military intervention in Lesotho, 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
 
 
Manifestations of ‘Privatised Militarism’ 
‘Privatised militarism’ refers to a range of cultural practices and social activities, which 
involve a systematic and extensive reliance on various non-state organised forms, expressions 
and instruments of violence. Three closely related illustrations of this privatised militarism are 
described: (i) increasing levels of highly organized criminal violence; (ii) the growth of 
armed, private security firms and vigilante groupings; and lastly, and most importantly (iii) 
individual reliance on instruments of violence – small arms.  
 
                                                 
39 Business Report, 30 May 2003. 
40 CCR (2003). 
41 The Star, 24 June 2003. 
42 Alex Vines, ‘Disarmament in Mozambique’, Journal of Southern African Studies, March (1998), pp.35-47. 
43 The Sunday Independent, 14 March 2003. 
 8
New forms of organised violence and conflict 
Post-apartheid South Africa has experienced rising rates of criminal violence, much of which 
involves small arms. Of the 24,765 murders reported in 1999, 11,130 or 45 per cent were 
committed with firearms. This is an average of 31 people a day. 44 A total of 22,402 incidents 
of attempted murder with a firearm were reported in 1999, an average of 61 people a day.45 
The number of people killed by guns is actually increasing annually from 41 per cent of all 
murders in 1994 to 49.3 per cent in 2000.46 According to a United Nations survey of 69 
countries, South Africa has one of the highest firearm-related homicide rates in the world, 
second only to Columbia. A total of 88,178 cases of robbery with a firearm were reported in 
2000.47  
 
Much of this criminal violence is rooted in the same patterns of economic deprivation and 
marginalisation that underpinned political violence during apartheid. As Simpson has written, 
“It is simply the forms and expression of violent conflict which has [sic] shifted in nature .... 
The criminalisation of politics and the politicisation of crime are really flip sides of the same 
coin”. 48 It is aggravated by the absence of faith in a rule of law and the politically 
contaminated nature of institutions of criminal justice inherited from the apartheid era. There 
is also a danger that a sense of impunity is developing, based on the granting of amnesty to 
confessed killers during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process.  
 
The privatisation of security 
Despite a dramatic shift of resources from the military to the police in terms of personnel and 
budget allocations, increasing numbers of citizens have lost confidence in the capacity of the 
state to protect them. The outcome is a ‘privatisation of security’.  While this process takes 
very different forms for different groups, it is rooted in the widespread perception that the 
post-apartheid police force is not only unable to maintain order but is itself a source of 
criminal violence, for example, through corruption or as a source of illegal firearms. Police in 
1997 reported 1,802 guns lost by police officials, but charges of negligent loss of a firearm 
were laid against only 143 police.49 Furthermore, thousands of people with criminal 
convictions have legal firearm licenses.50 
 
In 2003 it was announced that the total workforce of the South African Police Services 
(SAPS) would be increased from 131,560 to 140,560.51 However, numerous informants spoke 
of widespread police corruption, one stating that: “The police are the navigators of evil; they 
weaken the community, they sell guns and ammunition and are very easy to bribe. 
Roadblocks in Soweto are an opportunity for bribery”. The executive director of the 
Independent Complaints Directorate maintains that there has been a 100 per cent increase in 
police corruption cases over the past two years.52 Within the post-apartheid police force, the 
                                                 
44 Crime Information Management Centre, March 2000. 
45 Crime Information Management Centre, January 2000. 
46 Crime Information Analysis Centre, South African Police Services, 10 April  2002. 
47 Crime Information Analysis Centre, South African Police Services, 10 April 2002. 
48 Graeme Simpson, ‘Rebuilding Fractured Societies: Reconstruction, reconciliation and the changing nature of 
violence - Some self-critical insights from post-apartheid South Africa’, Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconstruction, 2000, at http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papundp.htm. 
49 Minister of Police, cited in The Star, 2 April 1998. 
50 Interview with the head of the investigation into the Central Firearms Register, Sheena Duncan, 2000. 
51 The Star, 17 June 2003. 
52 Cited in The Saturday Star, 7 June 2003. 
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abuse of power and brutality is widespread. Since the Independent Complaints Directorate 
was established within the police service in 1997, an average of sixty people a month have 
died as a result of police action or while in police custody. During 2002 the directorate 
investigated 214 deaths in custody and 371 deaths resulting from ‘police action’.53 This 
brutality is re-enforced by an aggressive masculinity, or ‘macho’ ethos that is predominant 
within the police force. This reflects the legacy of apartheid when the police mainly adopted 
military methods, equipment and structures.  
 
Demilitarisation is a key theme in police reform, which involves a concept of ‘community 
policing’, where the police are seen as being responsible to the communities they serve and 
the communities in turn are expected to assist the police. By making a community responsible 
for its own safety, this strategy is encouraging a process of privatisation of security. 
Implementation of this policy has been extremely uneven and patchy, but the outcome is that 
increasing numbers of South African citizens have come to rely on individual gun ownership, 
diverse forms of vigilantism and private security arrangements. In execution and practice, 
security is being converted into a commodity for those who can afford it.  
 
The number of private security guards now far outstrips the number in the police force. There 
are currently some 4,271 registered security companies in South Africa and in June 2003 
there were 248,025 registered security guards.54 They are all men, often ex-combatants, with 
easy access to weaponry for which they are not always adequately trained and there is little 
effective regulation of their activities. According to the Centre for Conflict Resolution Study 
“With some exceptions private security officers earn less than R800 a month, work long hours 
and have no employment benefits”. Some earn as little as R600 a month. 55 Increasing forms 
of criminal violence have fuelled the growth of this private security industry. 
 
In poorer communities this criminal violence often produces vigilante actions such as that of 
the Cape Town Muslims organised into PAGAD (People Opposed to Guns and Drugs). 
However, PAGAD itself has been involved in numerous acts of violence. Other forms of 
vigilante violence are often less structured and involve collective expressions of anger, such 
as the beating and even killing of suspected criminals. The actors engaged in these diverse 
forms of vigilante violence are mostly men, often conforming to scripts of masculinity that 
emphasise mens’ roles as ‘protectors’ and ‘defenders’ of their homes and communities. 
 
Guns, Violence and Social Identity 
Post-apartheid South Africa is undergoing a 'domestic arms race' in which sub-state groups 
(principally organised crime and private citizens) have acquired arms.  The number of guns is 
increasing annually in South Africa with the Central Firearms Register receiving about 20,000 
new applications monthly.  As Stuart Hall argued with respect to the social phenomenon of 
'mugging' in British society in the early 1970’s, gun violence serves as an articulator of social 
distress and in the South African social order it is a potential faultline of crisis.56 With 31 
firearm deaths a day, the gun is a symbol of our failure to build a secure society.  
 
                                                 
53 The Sunday Times, 1 June 2003. 
54 Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Safety and Security. 
55 CCR (2003), p.42. 
56 Stuart Hall, Policing the Crisis. Mugging the state and law and order, London: Macmillan, 1978. 
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The proliferation of the means of violence is one of the most distinctive features of 
contemporary South African society. This ‘diffusion’ of arms, suggests the dispersion and 
recirculation of arms through multiple channels to all levels of society. There is no 
homogeneous category of gun owners. But it is argued here that small arms are often the basis 
of a militarised identity that is lethally connected to culture, gender, ethnicity, race and 
nationality.  
 
The transition from authoritarian rule in South Africa has created a deep well of social anxiety 
as the familiar social identities, and traditional practices have been disrupted and breached.  
One consequence of this social anxiety is, as Stuart Hall has written in a different context, the 
“emergence of a predisposition to the use of ‘scapegoats’ into which all disturbing 
experiences are condensed”. 57 In the South African context there are two categories of such 
scapegoats – the ex-combatant and the illegal immigrant. Much press coverage of gun 
violence reflects a sense of blame and indignation towards these social categories. In the 
vocabulary of social anxiety, ex-combatants and illegal immigrants are easy symbols of 
menace, social dislocation and threat.    
 
This feeds into a militarist form of nationalism. A militarised form of citizenship 
characterised the apartheid era in that political citizenship involved compulsory national 
military service for white males. Blacks were denied access to firearms. This prohibition on 
arms was understood to involve a denial of African manhood as well as citizenship.58 The 
outcome of this historical legacy is a militarised citizenship and militarised masculinity, 
which has devastating social consequences and which will be very difficult to dislodge. 
Among many black South Africans there is now a widespread understanding that access to all 
levels of a powerful army, the South African National Defence Force, as well as access to 
legal gun ownership, are markers of liberation and of full citizenship in the post-apartheid 
state.  
 
A number of black informants emphasized specifically that gun ownership signals citizenship 
in a post-apartheid society: “Now that we're free it's our right to have a gun”, or “Under 
apartheid many whites bought guns ... the law stood for whites. Now it is painful for whites to 
see blacks owning guns”. The purchase of small arms by increasing numbers of black South 
Africans is thus a perverse indicator of changing power relations. Guns are also highly 
gendered. Men from diverse social categories are part of a robust ‘gun culture’ in 
contemporary South Africa. This gun culture feeds into and reinforces an ideology of 
militarism. It is not a fixed, ahistorical,  essentialist entity, but a set of highly heterogeneous 
resources, which are used selectively by members of different social groups. Overall, this 
culture operates to provide a social sanction to the possession of guns, and much gun violence 
follows culturally defined repertoires of behaviour.   
 
The values, social practices and institutions, which together constitute this gun culture, 
include what Raymond Williams called “consumerist militarism”. It involves the 
normalisation – and even glorification – of war, weaponry, military force and violence 
through TV, films, books, songs, dances, games, sports and toys. All of these cultural forms 
constitute a kind of ‘banal militarism’. Banal militarism operates near the surface of social 
life. It is embedded in everyday activities and works through prosaic routines and rituals to 
make war, weaponry and violence appear natural and inevitable. However, in local and global 
terms, Naylor has observed that: 
                                                 
57 Hall (1978), p.157. 
58 Ellen Hellman, ‘Non-Europeans in the Army’, Race Relations 10:2 (1943), p.45. 
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Probably the single most important thing stoking the (illegal arms) market from 
the demand side is the prevailing maldistribution of income, wealth and ecological 
capital. Until these are fairly and frankly addressed, there is little hope of damping 
the desire of the disadvantaged to seek the tools and rectify those disparities by 
violent means.59 
South Africa has one of the most unequal distributions of income of any country in the world, 
and this inequality is deepening under post-apartheid economic policies. Close to four million 
South Africans joined the ranks of those in poverty. 60 At the same time there is a process of 
remilitarisation underway which diverts the resources required to meet their basic needs.   
 
A Process of Remilitarisation 
Since 1998 a process of remilitarisation is evident in two developments. The first is the use of 
the military in foreign policy. The SANDF spent more than R30 million on its peacekeeping 
operation in Lesotho in 1998 – Operation Boleas – which involved several deaths. The 
SANDF in 2002 had some 930 people deployed in Africa in various tasks. These included a 
protection force of 701 personnel in Burundi, providing personal protection to some 27 
politicians; 200 specialists with the UN mission in the DRC and observers in the UN missions 
in Ethiopia and Eritrea.61 There are now a total of 926 SANDF soldiers in Burundi whose 
mission has changed from VIP protection to peacekeeping and implementing the ceasefire. 
South African soldiers, known as ‘sauza’ by locals, make up the bulk of the African force, 
with Ethiopia and Mozambique also participating.62 There are some 1,500 SANDF troops in 
the DRC to assist the United Nations in demobilising and disarming Rwandan rebels.63 This 
emphasis on peacekeeping represents a displacement of the priority to prevent war in the first 
place and has been used to promote and justify increased defence spending. For example, the 
Defence Minister recently argued that South Africa’s commitment to peacekeeping on the 
continent means that the SANDF should receive more money. 64 
 
The second indicator of a remilitarisation process in the region is the SANDF rearmament 
programme. This illustrates a number of disturbing trends such as a concentration of power in 
the executive and their lack of accountability to parliament or civil society, as well as a lack 
of transparency and the inadequacy of current procurement policies.  
 
Various opposition MPs and parliamentary committees, such as the Select Committee on 
Public Accounts (SCOPA), have raised criticisms about the industrial offsets, the hidden 
costs, the lack of ministerial accountability and the absence of criminal prosecutions. When 
Inkatha Freedom Party MP Gavin Woods resigned as SCOPA chairperson over “executive 
interference” he released a detailed study of procurement, citing more than fifty irregularities. 
He said, “These many failings go beyond simply being unacceptable. This would represent a 
crisis of credibility for procurement transactions anywhere else”. 65  
                                                 
59 R. T. Naylor, ‘Covert Commerce and Underground Financing in the modern Arms Black Market’, paper 
presented to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 24 February 1994, p.35. 
60 As measured by people in the lowest two expenditure categories (R0 - R399 and R400 - R799 per month) 
between 1999 and 2002 (South African Labour Bulletin, ‘Challenges of Growth and Poverty’, South African 
Labour Bulletin 27:5 (2003), p39). 
61 Boshoff (2002). 
62 The Star, 28 May 2003. 
63 The Sunday Times, 4 August 2002. 
64 Reported in The Sunday Times, 15 June 2003. 
65 Cited in The Mail and Guardian, 26 July 2002. 
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Governmental attempts to limit transparency and parliamentary oversight are also evident in 
the two-year delay to amendments to the National Conventional Arms Control Bill. The 
Parliamentary Committee on Defence Under-Chairperson, Thandi Modise, demanded 
oversight by the Committee on pending arms exports (which increased to R1.7 billion in 
2001) and greater detail in the annual reporting of completed reports. Modise argued that 
“oversight must be seen as a tool of democracy, not as competition between parliament and 
the executive”. 66 
 
Other disturbing trends illustrated by the rearmament programme include: 
· An intolerance of dissent - criticisms of the programme have been met with dismissal 
and hostility; 
· A widening gap between state policy and the electorate. According to one survey only 
12 per cent of ANC supporters surveyed supported the arms deal;67 
· A militarist nationalism, which claims that the stature of a nation lies in its weaponry 
rather than its ability to feed and house its people. For instance, it has been claimed 
that South Africa’s aspirations to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council “were 
laughable when measured against its ageing submarine capabilities. The ironic and 
sobering reality is that leadership claims are increasingly being measured against a 
country’s real or perceived military prowess”;68  
· The weakness of civil society and the absence of any mass-based, indigenous peace 
movement;69 
· Corruption on the part of prominent persons; 
· The contradiction of state policy documents such as the White paper on Defence 
(1996) and the Bill of Rights, in that it is a gross misdirection of resources that are 
needed to fight poverty and unemployment. A challenge along these lines was 
launched in the Cape High Court in 2002, calling on the court to declare the arms 
contracts null and void. It was argued that the decision to go ahead with the deal was 
“financially, economically and strategically irrational and thus unlawful and invalid”, 
and that the effect of the decision “is to unjustifiably limit the advancement of socio-
economic rights in the manner contemplated in the Bill of Rights”. 70 
· The lack of operational capability in the SANDF. Figures released in the latest 
national budget show the strategic arms procurement package will consume 45.8 per 
cent of the defence budget over the medium term. In this sense the package “is slowly 
strangling the defence force as capital spending squeezes out operational 
requirements”; 71 
· It has provided an impetus to increased arms expenditure in the region, particularly in 
Botswana and in Namibia; there are demands from members of parliament from the 
                                                 
66 Cited in The Mail and Guardian, 16 August 2002. 
67 Sunday Independent, 21 July 2002. 
68 Rocky Williams, ‘How does the arms deal measure up to our needs’, The Sunday Independent, 27 May 2001, 
p.10. 
69 Jacklyn Cock, ‘Butterfly wings and green shoots: the impact of peace organisations in Southern Africa’, Track 
Two. Centre for Conflict Resolution,10:1 (2001), pp.1-23. 
70 The Mail and Guardian , 26 July 2002. 
71 Sam Sole, ‘Arms deal cripples SANDF’, Mail and Guardian, 20 March 2003, p.6. 
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South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) for increased defence 
spending.72  
 
This last factor points to a further weakness deriving from a narrow focus on state militarism. 
This focus has two further serious consequences: the first is the neglect of non-state forms, 
expressions and instruments of militarism as described above. The second is a neglect of 
regional issues, which is especially serious given that over the last decade the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region has been wracked by inter and intra-state 
conflicts. These include civil war in the DRC and Angola, a short- lived coup in 1994 in 
Lesotho as well as a mutiny and external military intervention in 1998, a contested election in 
Malawi in 1999, a constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001, and on-going state terror in 
Zimbabwe. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) is a 
common security regime whose functions include the prevention and resolution of conflict, 
but this organ itself has been a source of tension and conflict.73  
 
One of the principles of the newly formed African Union (AU) is the establishment of a 
common defence policy for Africa. However it seems unlikely that it will become the primary 
peacekeeping authority for the continent. Recently South African President Thabo Mbeki 
pointed out that only five of the 53 AU states had ratified the instruments for establishing an 
African Peace and Security Council, which is intended to be “a standing decision-making 
organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa”.74 At the time of 
writing there is debate about whether the African Union should establish a single African 
Standby Force, or opt for five separate regional peacekeeping forces.75 
 
Despite being halved since 1989, South Africa’s defence budget is still the largest in Africa 
and is totally inappropriate to development needs. Certainly there have been changes. 
Whereas in 1989 defence spending was 4.5 per cent of GDP and 15.6 per cent of government 
expenditure, this fell to a total of R20.05 billion for fiscal year 2003-2004, amounting to 1.62 
per cent of GDP and 6.7 per cent of government expenditure. Finance Minister Trevor 
Manuel made provision in his November 2003 mini-budget for nearly R5 billion towards 
“unforseeable and unavoidable” expenditure in 2003-2004, including R500 million for the 
Defence Department available to be deployed in peace support initiatives. This matches the 




This chapter has tried to demonstrate the persistence of both old and new forms and levels of 
militarism in post-apartheid South Africa. Bahro, writing of a different context, has echoes for 
South Africa: “our whole social organism is riddled by the disease of militarism”. 76 A 
restructured, but not transformed, post-apartheid army represents a powerful block of military 
interests. A process of privatised militarism – in the sense of a systematic and extensive 
reliance on various non-state forms, expressions and instruments of violence – is evident in 
                                                 
72 Business Day, 11 April 2003. 
73 Laurie Nathan, ‘Organ failure: a review of the SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security’, Unpublished 
paper, Cape Town: Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2002. 
74 T. Matumi briefing the Defence Portfolio Co mmittee, 1 April 2003. 
75 The Star, 27 May 2003. 
76 Rudolf Bahro, From Red to Green London: Verso, 1982, p.69. 
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new forms of violence and conflict. It is also evident in the privatisation of security and the 
accompanying growth of private security firms, as well as the increase in diverse forms of 
vigilantism and the proliferation of small arms. These new forms of privatised militarism co-
exist with older institutional forms of militarism, in the shape of a powerful post-apartheid 
army in South Africa and extensive military activity by SADC member states in the region. 
The South African military cannot become a site of stabilisation for the country or the 
Southern Africa region as long as it continues to cannibalise scarce resources so that the real 
threats to our security – poverty, social disintegration and environmental deterioration – 
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